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STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
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:

RODNEY RAY,

:

Defendant/Appellant

Case No. 980140-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Court of
Appeals under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
There is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that the defendant was
guilty of kidnaping, aggravated assault, and possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Appellate courts give bioad deference to the fact
finder, and this Court "reviews the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from
that evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and reverses only if that
evidence is so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
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entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he ... was
convicted.'" State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1322 (Utah App. 1993).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties (1996) (partial)
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly
and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce,
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or
arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103. Aggravated Assault. (1995)
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to
produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301. Kidnaping. (1983)
(1) A person commits kidnaping when he intentionally or knowingly and without
authority of law and against the will of the victim:
(a) detains or restrains another for any substantial period; or
(b) detains or restrains another in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious
bodily injury; or
(c) holds another in involuntary servitude; or
(d) detains or restrains a minor without consent of its parent or guardian.
(2) Kidnaping is a felony of the second degree.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an information dated and filed October 30, 1997 (R. I-2), Rodney Ray was
charged with Kidnaping, a second degree felony, and Aggravated Assault, a third degree
felony. The victim was Norma Jean Strong. R. 1. In a second information dated
November 21, 1997, and filed November 24, 1997, Ray was charged with Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony. R. 139. After a
jury trial, starting on December 15, 1997 (R. 268), Ray was found guilty on all three
charges. R. 259-60, 263-64, 268 at 276-78..
On February 5, 1998, Ray was sentenced to two terms of one to fifteen years and
one term not to exceed five years. R. 263-64. On March 5, 1998, Ray filed this appeal.
R. 265-66.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The victim. Norma Jean Strong, had been in a relationship with Rodney Ray for
approximately two years. R. 268 at 60. On the afternoon of October 29, 1997, Ray was
supposed to appear in court in Moab. R. 268 at 61. Instead, Ray and Strong drove in
Strong's automobile to Monticello and rented a motel room. R. 268 at 61-62. Strong
went with Ray even though she was afraid of him and had sought a peace bond against
him because of his threats against her and her children. R. 268 at 63, 92-94. While in
Monticello, Ray and Strong argued and Ray threatened and screamed at Strong to the
point that she became afraid of him. R. 268 ?t 62. Along with threatening Norma Strong,
3

Ray also threatened her children.1 R. 268 at 63. Ray threatened to kill Strong because
she had "ruined his life." R. 268 at 64. At this time, Ray had a handgun in his
possession. R. 268 at 65-66.
Over the past few days, Ray had struck and choked Norma Strong on several
occasions and again at the motel in Monticello. R. 268 at 67, 73. Strong was afraid that
Ray would hurt her again. R. 268 at 68. While in the motel room, she saw that Ray had a
handgun with him. R. 268 at 98-99. Ray had been telling her off and on for days that he
was going to kill her. R. 268 at 99. She left the motel and went to a mini mart. From the
mini mart, Strong called Sheriff Kurt Brewer in Moab. R. 268 at 68. She told Sheriff
Brewer that she and Ray were at a motel in Monticello and that she was afra1'J of Ray
because he had been threatening to kill her. R. 268 at 68-69. Strong then called Ray at
the motel and told him that she had called the poMce. While driving her car from the mini
mart towards Moab, Strong passed the motel where she and Ray had rented a room. Ray
came out into the road. R. 268 at 69-70.
Ray told Strong that if she would just drive him back to Moab, to his court
appearance, that he would leave her alone. R. 268 at 70. Strong then permitted Ray to
get into her car. After driving about two miles, Ray had Strong turn around, let Ray out,
and return to the motel in Monticello to retrieve Ray's bag from their room. R. 268 at 70.

1

The children were in foster care because of Strong's failure to protect the
children from Ray. R. 268 at 63.
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On the trip back towards Moab, Ray again started to scream at Strong and to hit her. R.
268 at 71-72. At Blue Hill, Strong pulled off the road, got out of the car and informed
Ray that she wasn't going to ride with him anymore. R. 268 at 72. Ray chased after her,
hitting her, pulling her hair, and twisting her neck until Strong was in severe pain. R. 268
at 73. Ray continued to try and get Strong to return to the car, which she refused to do.
He finally took her car keys, and she told him he could have her car, but she didn't want
to be with him anymore. R. 268 at 73-74, 104.
Ray then drove the car towards Strong, stopping only inches from her. He then
drove off with Strong's car, but returned within a few minutes, again trying to get Strong
to enter the car. R. 268 at 74. When Strong agaia refused to get in the car, Ray put his
arms around Strong's neck and head and dragged her towards the car, covering her mouth
as she tried to scream, and choking her until she -ost consciousness. R. 268 at 74. Strong
believed Ray's threats, and thought he was trying to kill her. R. 268 at 86. Ray had also
been hitting Strong over the head with something hard that she thought felt like it was
Ray's handgun, and bit her on the nose. R. 268 at 75-77, 86. V/hen Strong came too, she
was being dragged to the car over gravel by Ray. He then put her in the back seat of the
car and drove off towards Moab. R. 268 at 77. Strong expressly testified that she was
forced back into the car by Ray against her will. R. 268 at 85. That for the approximately
two hours that she was with Ray from Blue Hill until she was left alone in Moab, that Ray
was holding her ?gainst her will. R. 268 at 85.
5

Mary Sheldon saw an assault take place at Blue Hill on October 29, 1997. R. 268
at 125. While driving in the area she saw, in her side-view mirror, a man jump from a car
and tackle another person. It only took a moment for the man to knock the other person
down (she was not able to see if the victim was a man or a woman). R. 268 at 125-126.
The man stayed on top of the other person for about three minutes. When the man stood
up, the victim did not move. For about five minutes thereafter, the man walked around as
if he was very nervous. R. 268 at 126-27. Fearful for her own safety, Ms. Sheldon did
not approach the scene of the assault, but watched from concealment, using a monocular.
R. 268 at 126-27. She then left and called 911, describing the assailant, the vehicle, and
its license plate number. R. 268 at 128-29. The description of the vehicle and the license
plate number provided by Ms. Sheldon matched Norma Jean Strong's vehicle. R. 268 at
132-33.
During this two hour time period that Ray held Strong against her will, Strong
repeatedly asked Ray to leave her alone; saying that he could have her car, but pleading
with him to let her go. R. 268 at 77-78. Ray told Strong that he was going to either shoot
her, or have someone else shoot her. R. 268 at 77. In Moab, Ray drove to the homes of
two friends (Jimmy Fisher and then Steve Caldwell). After about two hours, he finally
left Strong and went off, having told his friend that he was going to kill Strong, but that
he had to get to court and didn't have time to deal with her then. R. 268 at 78.
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Steve Caldwell testified that on October 29, 1997, Ray drove Strong's car to
Caldwell's home. Strong was lying in the backseat in a fetal position, acting incoherent,
saying: "Don't hurt me. Don't hit me anymore." R. 268 at 152-53. Caldwell testified
that Ray told him to watch Strong and that within fifteen minutes she would "come out of
it." R. 268 at 159. Ray left in a pickup that was driven there by an unknown person. R.
268 at 153. Caldwell was surprised that Strong did not seem to pay attention to him when
he asked her how she was. R. 268 at 161. After Ray left, Strong got out of her car and
started walking away. R. 268 at 153, 159. Caldwell started Strong's car, drove after her
and told her to take her car with her. R. 268 at 153-54, 159. Caldwell testified that, on
October 29, 1997, following what Ray had told him, he thought Strong was simply
putting on an act. But as of the time he testified in court, he said he was not sure
anymore. R. 268 at 159-62.
A neighbor of Caldwell's, Joe Nelson, testified that he heard a female screaming
on October 29, 1997. R. 268 at 167. He went to investigate and saw Ms. Strong in the
backseat of a car in fetal position with her arms up over her face. R. 268 at 168.2

2

Ray makes much of the fact that Mr. Nelson did not notice Ms. Strong's injuries
at that time. Defendant fails to mention to the Court that Mr. Nelson is legally blind (R.
268 at 169) and that his "vision goes in and out of focus a little bit." R. 268 at 168, 171
(that Ray's attorney was "blurry now and now you're not blurry. And now you're blurry
again."). Nelson also testified that he couldn't see most of Strong's face. R. 268 at 283.
Indeed, in trying to examine the photographs of Strong's injuries that were in evidence
(but have not been made a part of the record on appeal), Nelson could not tell if the
extensive bruising was bruising or blemishes or something else. R. 268 at 173.
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Strong testified to the many bruises, contusions, and cuts that had been inflicted
upon her by the defendant. R. 268 at 80. Four photographs of Strong's injuries were
introduced into evidence. R. 268 at 144-45.3 Strong testified that two of the bruises (one
by each eye) were from Ray striking her in the face on an earlier occasion. R. 268 at 121.
The other injuries shown in the photographs had been inflicted by Ray's assault on Strong
on October 29, 1997. R. 268 at 121-22. The extent of Strong's injuries was also
corroborated by the testimony of Suzanne Nebeker, a nurse practitioner. Ms. Nebeker
treated Strong for her injuries on October 29, 1997. R. 268 at 145-46. Strong had
numerous bruises , cuts and abrasions, many of them very fresh. R. 268 at 146-48.
Strong also testified that she and Ray used illegal drugs together on a regular basis.
R. 268 at 80, 90-92. She stated that Ray always had drugs with him, but that he did not
keep them in their motel rooms. Instead, it was ^ay's practice to conceal his drugs
outside of their room. R. 268 at 80-81. Two or three days before October 29, 1997,
Strong had driven Ray to Salt Lake. At that time Ray had a purple Crown Royal bag with
about eight ounces of illegal drugs, methamphetamine, in it (the bag was half full). R.
268 at 82-83, 91. Just a day or two before October 29, 1997, Ray had ordered Strong to
prepare a "rail" or line of methamphetamine for Ray's use from this bag. R. 268 at 91-92.
That both Ray and Strong had used some of the methamphetamine on that day. R. 268 at

3

These photographs and all of the exhibits in this matter have not been made a
part of the record, though they were considered by the jury in reaching its verdict.
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92. She also identified a grey sunglasses bag as being the same kind of bag that she had
seen in the possession of Ray. R. 268 at 84-85. After the assault, Strong told the police
of the methamphetamine that Ray had in his possession. That Ray did not leave it in the
hotel rooms, but hid it outside the room by burying it in the ground, among rocks, etc. R.
268 at 136-37.
Acting on Strong's information, police found an grey Oakley sunglass bag behind
a cement berm in the parking lot of the motel in Monticello that Ray and Strong had been
to the morning of October 29, 1997. R. 268 at 176. Inside the bag was approximately
four ounces of methamphetamine (113.2 grams) divided into six baggies. R. 268 at 177,
188-91. Kent Adair, Chief of Police of Monticello, testified that the bag, from its
appearance, seemed to have only recently been hidden behind the cement berm or wall.
R. 268 at 194. In his experience as a law enforcement officer, he had never known
anyone to just leave four ounces of methamphetamine somewhere and not stay very close
to it. R. 268 at 194.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Ray's only claim on appeal, relating to the kidnaping and aggravated assault
convictions, is that the jury should not have believed the testimony of his victim, Norma
Jean Strong. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, the evidence of Ray's guilt is neither inconclusive nor inherently improbable. At
most, the defendant can show that there was co fitting evidence, and that Ray had
9

sought to impeach his victim based upon her character. The mere existence of conflicting
evidence does not preclude a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
As to his conviction of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute,
Ray claims that neither possession nor intent to distribute was proven. But Strong
expressly testified that Ray, one or two days before the methamphetamine was found, had
about eight ounces of this controlled substance in his possession. She also testified that
on over one hundred occasions she had known Ray to conceal illegal drugs in the manner
that the methamphetamine found by the police had been concealed. R. 268 at 82.
Strong's testimony also proved Ray's intent to distribute. She testified that she had no
drugs of her own, but that she got her drugs from Rcty. R. 268 at 91. Indeed, she testified
that she had received and used some of the methamphetamine that R.ay had in his
possession just one or two days before the drug was recovered by the police. R. 268 at
91-92.
ARGUMENT
I. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE
JURY'S VERDICTS OF GUILTY OF KIDNAPING,
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND POSSESSION WITH
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE
As to his convictions of kidnaping and aggravated assault, the only claim raised on
appeal by the defendant, is that the jury erred in believing the testimony of the victim
Norma Jean Strorg. Defendant asks this Court to -veigh evidence that is alleged to
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conflict with the testimony of the victim, and find that the victim's testimony is so
improbable that the jury as a matter of law should have rejected it. As to his conviction
of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, Ray's only claim is that
there is no evidence to support the jury's conclusion that he possessed methamphetamine
and that he had the intent to distribute the same. In such circumstances, the legal standard
the defendant must meet is the same as in all challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a jury's verdict.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
conviction, we will reverse the conviction only when the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, "is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted."
State v. Ouada. 918 P.2d 883, 887 (Utah App. 1996). "It is not the function of a
reviewing court to determine guilt or innocence or judge the credibility of witnesses. The
mere existence of conflicting evidence, therefore, does not warrant reversal." State v.
Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991). "The presentation of conflicting evidence
does not preclude a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Kirgan, 712
P.2d 240, 241 (Utah 1985). "It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence
and to determine the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 84 (Utah
App. 1990).
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A. The evidence supports the jury's verdict of kidnaping and aggravated assault
Ray does not truly dispute that there is sufficient evidence of record to support his
convictions of kidnaping and aggravated assault. Instead, his claim is that the evidence
provided by the victim could not be considered by the jury because of his efforts to
impeach her credibility and to present conflicting evidence. While there is no evidence in
the record that Ms. Strong inflicted the wounds she received on October 29, 1997 on
herself, defendant claims that he could not be convicted of aggravated assault because of
this possibility. The only evidence of claims that the victim had previously given herself
self-inflicted wounds came from Ms. Strong's exhusband (R. 268 at 211-12), who
admitted that their divorce had been messy and various other reasons why he v,as angry at
Strong.4 R. 268 at 215-19. But, as this Court has previously stated, u[i]t is the exclusive
function of the jury to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses."
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d at 84.
Ray claims that this was not a kidnaping and aggravated assault, but a "repeated
patterns or games of pursuer and pursued" in which Ms. Strong was not a victim but a
participant in this "role playing." Brief of Appellant at 13. But there is no evidence of
any such gamesmanship in the record. Rather, the evidence before the jury was that Ms.

4

Steve Caldwell testified that he had seen the victim striking herself nrthe head
while complaining of pain in the head, but had never known her to inflict wounds or
bruises upon herself. R. 268 at 163-64.
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Strong found herself the victim of partner abuse. R. 268 at 149. When she did try to
escape from Ray, he beat her unconscious and held her by force for about two hours.
Nor is the testimony of the victim so inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt. At Blue Hill, the ongoing
abuse she received from Ray brought her to the breaking point. She sought to escape
from her abuser. Instead, he assaulted her using means and force likely to produce death
or serious bodily injury. Indeed, he succeeded in rendering her unconscious. He then
kidnaped her for a period of about two hours rather than let her escape from him.
Contrary to the claim of the defendant, the victim's story of the aggravated assault
is partially corroborated by the testimony of an eye witness. Strong testified, that Ray
drove her car towards her as if he was intending to run her over. R. 268 at 74. Ray then
drove off with her car for a few minutes. When he returned, and she still refused to go
with him, he then assaulted her in an effort to force her into the car, making her lose
consciousness. R. 268 at 74-77. Ray's return, and his use offeree, was witnessed by
Mary Sheldon. She corroborated Ms. Strong's testimony thai Ray knocked Strong down
and that after Ray spent three minutes on top of Strong, she did not see Strong move at all
for the next five minutes.5 R. 268 at 125-27.

5

While Ms. Sheldon did not recognize the defendant, and never saw clearly the
victim, she identified Ms. Strong's car by its appearance and by its license number.
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Further, Strong's testimony was supported by the evidence of her injuries. Her
injuries were consistent with Strong's testimony as to what Ray had done to her. That a
legally blind witness, who did heard Strong screaming and saw her in fetal position in th<
back of her own car, could not recall seeing the injuries did not prove the injuries were
not present. Mr. Nelson testified that he saw things shifting in and out of focus, or blurry
and he wasn't even sure that, with his vision, he recognized the injuries shown in the
photographs in evidence as being injuries. Mr. Nelson also testified that when he saw
Strong, she had her hands in front of her face.
It was the jury's responsibility to resolve questions of reliability and to weigh the
conflicting evidence and draw conclusions therefrom. State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918,
924 (Utah App. 1990). Ray incorrectly asks this Court to consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to the defendant, and not in the light most supportive of the jury's
verdict. By their verdicts, it is clear that the members of the jury found Ms. Strong's
testimony to be credible. If the jury's findings can *%be reasonably made from the
evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, our inquiry stops, and
we sustain the verdict." State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d at 924. Ray asks this Court to
independently judge the credibility of the victim's testimony and reconsider the jury's
decision that it was credible. That is not the function of an appellate court. For these
reasons, the State of Utah asks this Court to affirm the defendant's convictions of
kidnaping and aggravated assault.
14

B. The evidence supports defendant's conviction of possession of methamphetamine
The victim's direct testimony was that Ray had up to eight ounces of
methamphetamine in his possession either one or two days before October 29, 1997. Her
testimony was also clear that Ray had distributed, and intended to further distribute, the
methamphetamine. For some years, Utah's law has not required that the distribution of a
controlled substance be for value for it to be a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8
(1996). It is enough that it simply be distributed. Ray's sharing of his methamphetamine
with Ms. Strong was sufficient to prove intent to distribute. Ray was the sole source of
the drugs that Ms. Strong used. It was a method he used to control people, including Ms.
Strong. R. 268 at 80-82, 90-92.
Ms. Strong's testimony that Ray had possession of methamphetamine, with the
intent to distribute it, was corroborated by the police discovering approximately four
ounces of methamphetamine on October 29, 1997, by following the information provided
by her. Over a hundred times, she had seen the defendant conceal illegal drugs outside
their motel room. R. 268 at 82. The methamphetamine discovered by the police was
recently concealed in the same manner in a container identical to one the victim had seen
in the possession of the defendant. Further, the fact that the methamphetamine was
divided into six parts is further corroborative evidence of his intent to distribute, either to
Ms. Strong or to others.

15

This was not a case such as State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1998), cert,
granted. Unlike Layman, there is direct evidence in this matter of both Ray's possession
of the controlled substance and of his intent to distribute. Again, the only real issue is the
credibility of the victim's testimony. Because the jury found her testimony credible, it
convicted Ray on all three charges. Clearly, the jury rejected the claim of the defendant
that his victim had planted the drugs in such a manner as to lead to his conviction. For
these reasons, the State of Utah asks this Court to affirm the conviction of the defendant
for possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to distr bute as
well.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the State of Utah urges this Court to affirm the
convictions of the defendant for Kidnaping, Agg^ wated Assault, and Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND A PUBLISHED OPINION
NOT REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
The State of Utah does not request oral argument and a published opinion in this
matter. The questions raised in this appeal are not such that oral argument or a published
opinion are necessary, though the State of Utah desires to participate in oral argument if
such is held by the Court.
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day of February, 1999.

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
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